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Abstract: This paper presents an enhanced interface for an e-voting client application that partially runs inside a small,
portable terminal with reduced interaction capabilities. The interface was enhanced by cooperating with the
hosting computer where the terminal is connected to: the hosting computer shows a detailed image of the
filled ballot. The displayed image does not convey any personal information, namely the voter’s choices, to
the hosting computer; voter’s choices are solely presented at the terminal. Furthermore, the image contains
visual authentication elements that can be validated by the voter using information presented at the terminal.
This way, hosting computers are not able to gather voters’ choices or to deceive voters, by presenting tampered
ballots, without being noticed.
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet voting systems are appealing for several
reasons, one of them being the mobility of voters. Us-
ing the Internet, voters may contact the right electoral
servers virtually from anywhere in the world. How-
ever, the computers used by voters to express their
will must be trusted. Namely, they should not steal
authentication credentials, link votes to voters or in-
terfere destructively with the voting process. In other
words, voters should interact only with a trusted ap-
plication, running on top a secure platform – trusted
computing base, TCB – when expressing their vote.
However, this goal is hard to achieve. Nevertheless,
this “secure platform problem” is a fundamental prob-
lem that needs to be solved when trying to design re-
mote electronic voting systems.
In the context of the Robust Electronic Voting Sys-
tem (REVS (Joaquim et al., 2003)) was developed
an intrusion-tolerant voting client using a TCB com-
posed by a FINREAD portable terminal and a smart-
card (Zu´quete et al., 2007). The terminal provides
protection against disclosure for user input (authenti-
cation secrets, voter’s choices) and output (presenta-
tion of voter’s choices). Furthermore, it provides out-
put authentication for the presented ballot. With this
TCB, a voter may securely use any hosting computer
to access REVS electoral servers in order to vote in a
particular election. However, the line-based interface
of a FINREAD terminal is too reduced to give a clear,
global view of the ballot and the voter choices. This
issue is particularly relevant when ballots have many,
long questions, each with several possible answers.
This paper describes an enhancement of the in-
terface between the TCB and the voter to facilitate
voting processes. To enhance the interface, we ex-
tended the functionality of the voting terminal for co-
operating with a hosting computer in showing images
of ballots being filled. However, since we cannot
trust hosting computers for keeping secret the choices
expressed by voters, the images presented by host-
ing computers cannot contain any reference to voters’
choices. One way to achieve this goal could be to use
visual cryptography (M. and Shamir, 1995), but this
technique is not convenient for voters, raises many
operational problems and creates coercion vulnerabil-
ities. Alternatively, we used directly readable text for
helping voters to get a clear view of their choices, but
in such a way that no relevant, personal information
if leaked for hosting computers.
Furthermore, the presented image should be im-
mune to modifications introduced by hosting com-
puters, which requires their visual authentication by
voters. This means that either (i) the voter sees the
correct ballot or (ii) the voter sees a tampered image
but the tampering action is clearly perceptible by the
voter. The solution adopted allows the voter to re-
peatedly check the integrity of the displayed image
using contents simultaneously presented on the ter-
minal display.
2 REVS VOTING SYSTEM
REVS is a blind-signature based voting system
designed for providing secure and robust electronic
voting using the Internet (Joaquim et al., 2003). The
system has a client application (Voter Module) that
conducts the interaction with a set of electoral servers.
To improve the privacy of the voter and accuracy of
his participation in the election, the Voter Module
should use a TCB for protecting some critical data
and voter-computer interactions. Concerning the user
interface, the TCB must provide:
• Trusted output: correctly present to the voter au-
thenticated ballots provided by electoral servers.
• Protected input: securely get all input from the
voter – authentication secrets and ballot choices.
The TCB was implemented with a smartcard and
a FINREAD (FINREAD Consortium, 2003) reader,
which has I/O capabilities (Zu´quete et al., 2007).
Fig. 1 shows the new architecture of REVS using this
TCB. FINREAD terminals are embedded systems ca-
pable of hosting different Java applets (Finlets) and a
JVM to execute them. A FINREAD device has re-
duced human-machine I/O capabilities: it has a small
LCD display, with 4 lines of 20 characters, and a 16-
key pin-pad (see Fig. 2). Finlets control all interac-
tions with the smartcard and can use the terminal I/O
capabilities to perform protected input/output with the
terminal user (e.g. get the smartcard PIN).
One of the tasks of the Voter Module Finlet is to
deal with the interface with voter, namely with the
presentation and filling of ballots. Ballots are signed
XML documents fetched from electoral servers and
validated by voters using their smartcard. If valid, a
ballot is presented and filled using the FINREAD dis-
play and pin-pad. The part of the Voter Module that
runs in the hosting computer has no direct influence
in the presentation and filling of the ballot.
2.1 FINREAD Human Interface Issues
Due to the FINREAD display limitations, the pre-
sentation of the ballot in this device was completely
changed from the original REVS model. Further-
more, the ballots’ text to present to voters must
be produced differently by the electoral Authorities,
namely using reduced amounts of text in questions
an answers taking into consideration the reduced ca-
pabilities of a FINREAD display. Nevertheless, the
FINREAD display is too reduced for having a clear
and complete view of the ballot and voter’s choices.
This limitation can be a major constraint when filing
long ballots, with many questions and answers.
To overcome the physical output limitations of the
FINREAD terminal we considered a solution based
on cooperating with the hosting computer: the termi-
nal produces an image of the filled ballot and sends it
to the Voter Module for being displayed at the hosting
Figure 1: Evolution in the architecture of REVS for sup-
porting a smartcard/FINREAD TCB at the voter side.
Figure 2: FINREAD terminal from Omnikey.
computer. But for producing these images we have
two critical requirements:
• The displayed image should not disclose any use-
ful information to others than the voter.
• The displayed image should allow the voter to
easily detect tampering actions performed by the
Voter Module and/or the hosting computer.
The first requirement is critical for the confiden-
tiality of voters choices. Otherwise, a malicious host-
ing computer (or Voter Module) could store the im-
ages of the ballots presented with voters’ choices.
Furthermore, images should not enable attackers to
coerce voters to prove how they have voted.
The second requirement is critical for prevent-
ing a malicious hosting computer from presenting a
tampered ballot, which could mislead voters in many
ways by (i) modifying questions, (ii) changing possi-
ble answers or (iii) changing chosen answers.
In the next section we discuss related work re-
garding the secure presentation of contents (images)
produced by our TCB. Afterwards, we describe some
usability issues of voting systems are their impact in
our system. Then, we describe our contribution to en-
hance the interface of the voting terminal.
3 RELATED WORK
Visual cryptography (M. and Shamir, 1995) al-
lows humans to decrypt an image using another im-
age, printed in a transparency. The encrypted image
is presented in the screen, or printed in a sheet of pa-
per, and the decryption transparency, a slide with a
painted decryption pattern, must be placed on top of it
to turn an area filled with apparently random dots into
something understandable by a human. Visual cryp-
tography can also be used for content integrity; (Naor
and Pinkas, 1997) discusses several visual authentica-
tion methods, using visual cryptography, for any kind
of visual data: numerical, textual or graphical.
Visual cryptography could be used for ensuring
the privacy and integrity control of the ballot im-
ages presented by hosting computers; the key to en-
crypt the image could be entered with the FINREAD
pin-pad. However, decryption transparencies are not
convenient for voters, which already have to carry
a smartcard and a reader, a single decryption trans-
parency is not likely to be a ubiquitous solution, since
it may not work well with all displays, and keys and
transparencies make voters vulnerable to coercion.
(Gobioff et al., 1996) discusses minimal proper-
ties necessary for secure input or output of a smart-
card in a point-of-sale (POS); a POS is comparable to
our hosting computer but using an ordinary smartcard
reader without human I/O capabilities. They discuss
additional I/O capabilities that smartcards could have
and how they could be used to address security prob-
lems raised by hostile POS environments. The aspects
more relevant for our work are, using their terminol-
ogy, privacy of the output and general trusted output.
Privacy of the output is addressed with one-time
pad encryption, using a key provided by the smart-
card owner using a smartcard input keyboard. How-
ever, the decryption of the encrypted output is not
addressed, nor even who is going to do so; in our
case we could consider visual decryption by the voter
using a personal decryption transparency. General
trusted output is addressed with trusted input and one
bit of trusted output. The method relies on feedback:
every output bit is feed back into the smartcard, using
the trusted input, and when an error is detected the
trusted output bit displays the error condition. In our
case a feedback mechanism is possible, but not with
the bits of the displayed image. As we will see, we
used characters.
Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA (von Ahn
et al., 2003)) are ways of transforming text into an
image such that only humans can understand it. At-
tacking computer programs are unable to extract the
text from the image due to the properties of the trans-
formation – a hard artificial intelligence (AI) transfor-
mation (a problem can be solved by a majority of hu-
mans but not by a computer using state-of-the-art AI
programs). Consequently, attacking computers also
have difficulty to make a useful but undetectable mod-
ification to the text within the image. Thus, if the text
contains some visual authentication element, it may
be used to check the integrity of the image. However,
CAPTCHAs are some times hard to understand even
by humans and are used to transform single words or
small sentences, not long texts, such as electoral bal-
lots. Furthermore, attacking computers may use back-
end pools of people to interpret CAPTCHAs.
(King and dos Santos, 2005) extends CAPTCHA
by introducing keyed AI transformations. These ex-
tend text→image transformations like CAPTCHA to
include a secret shared between the image producer
and the authenticator. This way, attacking computers
cannot replace entire images based on public contents
(e.g. electoral ballots). The examples, however, are
with simple, short sentences, and not with long texts,
such as electoral ballots.
(Hanley et al., 2005) proposed an e-voting system
based on keyed AI transformations. Voters get ballots
transformed by CAPTCHAs and should be able to un-
derstand them and to make a choice by pointing out
a particular section of the ballot (an area of an image,
a frame of a film, etc.). The selected section is ran-
domly mapped per voter to a particular answer. Un-
fortunately, the system has many security problems:
the recording of presented ballots and choices made
by voters may undermine their privacy and ballots are
not authenticated.
4 VOTING USABILITY ISSUES
Voting processes raise several usability issues for
several reasons (Bederson et al., 2003; Greene et al.,
2006; Byrne et al., 2007). First, they are to be used
by people with different abilities, such as language
understanding, different impairments, such as blind-
ness, etc. In short, the population they are targeted to
is very heterogeneous in many aspects, but the system
should not disfranchise any voter because of their dif-
ference. This means that the usability of voting sys-
tems must be very carefully evaluated to detect and
eliminate their disfranchising potentials.
Second, usually voters are not trained to use spe-
cific voting devices. Many voters effectively deal with
voting devices the first time they have to use them in
real elections. This may create many usability prob-
lems, which are amplified by the reluctance of asking
for help (because of privacy concerns), the pressure
of long waiting queues, etc.
Its now time to comment our proposal regarding
usability issues. First, we are not proposing a per-
fect voting terminal for being used by everybody in all
elections. We are proposing an enhanced, visual inter-
face for a portable, voting terminal. The advantage of
using the terminal is that voters may potentially vote
anywhere, but that is not mandatory, only possible.
Therefore, we do not advocate the use of this terminal
for all voters, but only for those willing to get some
advantage out of it (such as mobility). And, of course,
we assume they can read the ballot’s text.
Second, this paper presents only one possible in-
terface for the portable terminal, using text. Further-
more, the interface uses images and colors for text
authentication, which is not suitable for blind peo-
ple and creates problems to people with visual im-
pairments, such as color blindness. However, other
interfaces may be addressed in the future for helping
people with difficulties in using this one (using pic-
tures, audio, braille output interfaces, etc.).
Third, a portable, personal voting terminal allows
voters to get used to it, to learn very well how it works
and to customize its behaviour in order to facilitate the
participation in elections. Therefore, in our work it is
relevant to discuss several interface possibilities and
their pros and cons, and configuration options, instead
of proving a single, inflexible and well-studied inter-
face. This thus not mean that we do not need to carry
on a detailed usability study with real voters in real-
istic elections. However, unlike other voting systems,
customization is relevant and should be considered in
the interface proposal and also in the training of vot-
ers, something that was not considered in (Bederson
et al., 2003; Byrne et al., 2007).
Finally, in the interface here presented we deal
with the visual authentication of ballot contents. As
far as we know, no voting system until now did that;
voters assume the system provides them the right bal-
lot, and not a false one. Visual authentication is a task
that is natural to increase the cognitive workload of
voters, therefore making even more difficult to evalu-
ate the usability of the system. In this document we
anticipate some cognitive workload problems, some
of them detected with practical experience with users,
and we draw some possible solutions to deal we them.
Again, our goal was to provide flexibility to the con-
figuration of the interface in order to better adapt it to
the terminal owner. Nevertheless, we assume that vot-
ers willing to use this interface for some reason (such
as mobility) are aware and comfortable with the extra
workload it may introduce in voting processes.
5 ENHANCED INTERFACE
We will now present our contribution, a solution
for improving the interface of the FINREAD voting
terminal without reducing its security. First we de-
scribe how filled ballots are presented to voters using
the display of hosting computers but without disclos-
ing voters’ choices. Next we discuss alternatives for
enforcing the integrity control of the presented ballot
and we present our preferred solutions.
5.1 Non-disclosure of Voters’ Choices
The presentation of filled ballots without disclosing
voters’ choices forced us to look for some way to
represent a filled ballot other than traditional ones
(e.g. with crosses inside boxes or completed arrows).
We used the fact of having two separate displays – the
terminal display and the display of the hosting com-
puter – to present complementary contents conveying
useful information to the voter only. Naturally, the se-
curity of this approach requires that attackers cannot
monitor both displays simultaneously.
The link between the information presented in
each display is done with numbers. Each possible an-
swer to a question is given a number (hardcoded in
the ballot XML or dynamically given by the termi-
nal). When a question and its possible answers are
displayed at the hosting computer, the numbers are
displayed as well. Simultaneously, on the terminal
display are presented only the numbers corresponding
to the answers chosen by the voter for that question.
For clarification, here is an example. Let’s assume
that a question in the ballot has 3 alternatives: YES,
NO or none of them (blank), numbered from 0 to 2 (0
for blank). If the voter chooses option NO, the image
presented on the screen and the information presented
on the terminal will look like shown in Fig. 3.
Multiple choices may be expressed using the same
model, requiring only displaying on the terminal more
than one number. Considering the question presented
in Fig. 4, where the voter can choose up to four an-
swers (Cat, Fish, Dog and Bird), the number of all the
chosen ones is presented in the terminal.
For questions with many possible answers, for in-
stance, a number between 0 and 100, the solution is
different (see Fig. 5). In this case the image pre-
sented by the hosting computer will only contains two
choices, one for a blank vote (NO ANSWER) and an-
other for an expressed vote (ANSWER), and the ter-
minal refers the chosen one; but for an expressed vote
it will also display the answer (18 in Fig. 5-b).
The voting interface for the voter works like this.
The hosting computer displays an image of the bal-
lot containing the current question and the remaining
questions that fit in the allocated image space; cur-
rent question and answers are highlighted (see Fig. 6).
The voter reads the current question and chooses one
or many answers using the terminal pin-pad. The an-
swers are shown in the terminal as they are expressed;
at the end the voter uses a function key of the pin-pad
(we used the green key) to confirm the choices and
proceed to the next question.
For questions with a single answer from a large set
of possible values (as in Fig. 5), the voter first chooses
0 or 1 with the pin-pad, for choosing between a blank
vote and an expressed vote. Then, if she chose 1, she
enters a specific answer using the pin-pad. Finally,
she confirms the answer, using the confirmation key
of the terminal, or repeats the process.
Before committing to the vote with a function key
of the pin-pad (we used the yellow key), the voter can
browse through the questions, which are highlighted
at the hosting computer display, and check the corre-
sponding answers on the terminal display. Browsing
Tradicional vote
Are you a regular voter?
2 YES 4 NO
Vote with FINREAD terminal and hosting computer
Terminal Vote = 2
Computer Are you a regular voter?
screen 0) 1) YES 2) NO
Figure 3: Voting with a single answer per question (voter
chose NO). With the terminal the voter entered 2 for NO.
Tradicional vote
Preferred domestic animals?
4 Cat 2 Fish 4 Dog 2 Bird
Vote with FINREAD terminal and hosting computer
Terminal Vote = 1 3
Computer Preferred domestic animals?
screen 0) 1) Cat 2) Fish 3) Dog 4) Bird
Figure 4: Voting with several answers per question (voter
chose Cat and Dog). With the terminal the voter entered 1
and 3 for Cat and Dog, respectively.
(a)
Tradicional vote
Best year of your life (0-100)?
Vote with FINREAD terminal and hosting computer
Terminal Vote = 0 (blank)
Computer Best year of your life (0-100)?
screen 0) NO ANSWER 1) ANSWER
(b)
Tradicional vote
Best year of your life (0-100)? 18
Vote with FINREAD terminal and hosting computer
Terminal Vote = 1 (18)
Computer Best year of your life (0-100)?
screen 0) NO ANSWER 1) ANSWER
Figure 5: Voting with a single answer from a large set of
possible answers per question. In (a) the voter did not vote
and in (b) the voter chose 18. With the terminal the voter
entered 0 for a blank vote (a) and 1 and a number for an
expressed vote (b).
up and down is performed with a pair of pin-pad func-
tion keys (we used keys ’*’ and ’.’). The voter is also
able to delete answers, with another function key (we
used the red key), while filling the ballot or review-
ing her answers. We believe that this reduced set of
functionalities is enough for providing a simple and
efective browsing through ballot questions and filling
and reviewing of chosen answers.
5.2 Authentication of Displayed Ballots
Electoral ballots are usually public; therefore attack-
ers may use their information to interfere with the
displaying of ballots in tampered hosting computers.
Therefore, voters using the terminal must use some
mechanism to ensure that the image displayed by the
hosting computer was generated by the terminal from
a correct XML document.
Figure 6: Ballot filling interface. On the left is the image
presented by the hosting computer, which changes along
the filling process and highlights the current question and
all its possible answers. On the right is the text presented
by the terminal — the answers to the current question.
The integrity of the XML document is assured by
digital signatures; the XML is signed by an electoral
Authority and the signature validated by the terminal
using the Authority’s public key stored inside voters’
smartcards (Zu´quete et al., 2007). The integrity con-
trol of the ballot image is more complex, as it needs
to be performed by the voter. This may be accom-
plished using visual authentication, where the voter,
using observation and some helping technology, can
ensure that the displayed image if fresh and correct.
To produce visually authenticated images with the
terminal we can use voter-provided keys: the voter
introduces a key using the terminal pin-pad, and the
terminal uses it to authenticate the image. This key
may be a long-term key used for visual cryptography
or a fresh, random key for a keyed AI transformation.
Another alternative is to use feedback: the termi-
nal produces an image with highlighted, randomly se-
lected characters belonging to the ballot text, which
should be feed back in the correct order to the ter-
minal using its pin-pad (active validation). However,
for pin-pads such as the one of the FINREAD termi-
nal, which only contains numbers and a few func-
tion keys (cf. Fig 2), the introduction of alphabeti-
cal characters is not straightforward. One alternative
is to map several characters to each key, as in mobile
phones; another alternative is to show all the feedback
characters, without repetitions and in a different order
(e.g. alphabetically) in the terminal display and use
the pin-pad to navigate through them and to select the
observed highlighted characters in the correct order.
Yet another alternative is to let the terminal to
randomly choose keys or feedback characters and to
show them using its display. This way, the voter only
needs to check if the data displayed by the terminal
matches the authentication data existing in the pre-
sented image (passive validation).
Hereafter we will describe a solution using feed-
back characters with active or passive user validation.
For each question the terminal chooses a random set
(a) Passive validation of a feedback string
(b) Active validation of a feedback string
Figure 7: Visual authentication of displayed questions and
answers with colours and a feedback string for (a) passive
validation or (b) active validation; the terminal is using red
for highlighting feedback characters. With passive valida-
tion, the voter checks if the feedback string matches the red
characters of the image in the correct order. With active val-
idation, the voter chooses, by navigating with the terminal
pin-pad on the alphabetically ordered feedback string, the
red characters in the correct order.
of feedback characters from the question and its an-
swers. The feedback characters are then written in the
image with some differentiating characteristic, such
as a different colour or letter case. The voter iden-
tifies the feedback characters in the image and val-
idates them using active or passive validation. For
differentiating feedback characters in the images we
used colours. Colours, or at least a small set of basic
colours, are easy to identify and differentiate by most
people, except colour-blind people.
A simple way to use colours to identify feedback
characters is the following. First the terminal ran-
domly chooses a highlight colour from a list of basic
colours (red, green, blue, yellow, white, black, etc.).
The terminal will then compose the text in the im-
age using the highlight colour for the feedback char-
acters and random colours, from the rest of the colour
list, for the other characters (see example in Fig. 7).
A malicious hosting computer cannot conclude, from
the text colours, which are the feedback characters;
thus, producing a tampered image for a question and
its answers has a probability of success that depends
on guessing the actual highlighting colour.
For tampering an image without being noticed, an
attacker must guess the highlight colour, identify all
the highlighted characters of each image and produce
a different, meaningful question and answers using
the same ordered set of highlighted characters. Fig-
ure 8 shows two different tampered images that can
replace the image presented in Fig. 7 and 8-a: image
(b) has a different order in the answers and is correctly
authenticated if the highlight colours are red or black;
image (c) has a different question and is correctly au-
thenticated if the highlight colour is blue.
Assuming that it is feasible to create a convincing
tampered image for any highlight colour, the success
of a tampering attack basically depends on the num-
ber of colours used and on the possibility of creating
a single tampered image for more than one colour (as
in Fig. 8-b). Thus, using more colours reduces both
the probability of guessing the actual highlight colour
(a) Original image built with highlight colour red
(b) Tampered answers for red and black highlight colours
(c) Tampered question for the blue highlight colour
Figure 8: Original image and tampered images that may be
considered valid by the voter.
Figure 9: Improved visual authentication of questions and
answers with 2 highlight colours (red and black) out of 4
and passive validation of feedback strings.
and the length of the feedback string presented in the
voting terminal, improving usability.
On the other hand, the number of colours used and
its distribution along the question and answers is also
critical to the process of building a convincing tam-
pered image. For instance, using only two colours
and alternating them on consecutive characters clearly
complicates the task of the attacker for building a con-
vincing image. However, the fewer colours are used,
the longer is the feedback string displayed in the vot-
ing terminal. Concluding, we have different argu-
ments for using a few or many colours.
A compromise solution is the following. Assum-
ing that there are N possible colours, all of them are
used and the terminal chooses 2 highlight colours, one
for the question and the other for the answers, pos-
sibly the same. For colouring the characters, all N
colours are used in blocks of contiguous N characters,
but not always with the same order.
With this approach we reduce the probability
of correctly guessing the actual highlighting colours
from 1N to
1
N2 without significantly complicating the
user interface. Since at least one feedback charac-
ter appears in each N-character block, attackers ex-
perience tampering constraints along the entire text.
Nevertheless, an attacker may precompute all possi-
ble alternative images for any set of highlight colours,
which are NL/N images, where L is the number of
characters in the original image, and chose the appro-
priate one with the guessed highlighting colour pair.
Figure 9 shows an implementation of this authen-
tication strategy using only 4 possible colours (RGB
plus black) and two highlight colours, thus N = 4.
The two feedback strings are short, with 6 and 5 char-
acters each, being easy to check. The probability of
guessing the actual pair of feedback colours is 116 and
the number of colouring alternatives is 442/4 ≈ 106,
which is high enough for complicating the task of pre-
computing all possible, convincing tampered images.
6 ANALYSIS
6.1 Voter Privacy
If an attacker could monitor the voting terminal of
a voter then it could get all the voter’s options, de-
stroying this way his privacy. Thus, a fundamental
requirement for using correctly the voting terminal is
to prevent anyone from monitoring its input interface
– the pin-pad. Since the pin-pad is close to the dis-
play lines, we can also assume that attackers cannot
monitor the terminal display.
Assuming that attackers cannot monitor the termi-
nal interface, then it’s straightforward proving that at-
tackers controlling hosting computers cannot get any
useful information: displayed ballots have no voters’
choices and feedback characters are randomly chosen
by terminals. Displayed images gathered by attack-
ers cannot also be used latter to coerce voters to prove
how they have voted, because images do not contain
any personal information.
6.2 Image Authentication
The tampering of displayed images is possible, but
the probability of success is small, though not ne-
glectable. This probability depends on two factors:
(i) guessing the right set of highlight colours and (ii)
producing a convincing image while keeping the or-
dered sets of highlighted characters. These tasks can
be made arbitrarily hard by using high values for the
total number of colours (N) and the number of high-
light colours (H), but that has also impact on usability.
Namely, using high values for N is inconvenient be-
cause colours become complex to describe in the ter-
minal (e.g. medium spring green) and hard to match
on the displayed image; this last issue is particularly
relevant for colour-blind people. Using high values
for H is also inconvenient, has it floods the terminal
display with feedback strings, ultimately displaying
the majority of the characters in the question and an-
swers but in a mangled fashion. Therefore, for usabil-
ity we should keep N and H as low as possible.
An alternative for reducing the probability of suc-
cess of a tampering attack is to enable a voter to check
on the terminal feedback strings for different colours,
but not all at the same time. For instance, if the first
presented strings are for red and black, the next strings
may use other combinations of colours, like red and
green, blue and green, etc. The continuous valida-
tion should be triggered by the voter, using a terminal
key (we used the key ’F’), and the image displayed
should always be the same. The voter may stop at any
time for authenticating the displayed image against
the feedback strings currently presented on the termi-
nal. This repeated authentication is easy to implement
and enables voters to make the authentication mecha-
nism as strong as personally required: the more feed-
back strings are checked, the higher is the probability
of detecting a tampered image.
Colour-blindness raises obvious usability prob-
lems for the proposed visual authentication mecha-
nism using colour-based feedback. Allowing vot-
ers to continuously change the feedback strings may
partially solve the problem for people with limited
colour-blindness, as they may change the set of feed-
back strings until being able to clearly distinguish the
two highlighting colours used in the feedback strings.
However, for people that only see black and white it
simply should not work; for those people another vi-
sual authentication mechanism must be used.
6.3 Feedback Validation
We referred two possible policies that can be used to
visually authenticate images using feedback charac-
ters — passive validation or active validation. With
passive validation, voters mentally check the high-
lighted characters against the feedback string and con-
clude if the image is genuine or a fraud. On the con-
trary, with active validation, voters have to use the
pin-pad to input the highlighted characters and the ter-
minal checks them against the feedback strings.
Passive validation is more convenient for users but
also more prone to human errors. Careless voters may
proceed with the voting without properly authenticat-
ing the images or even proceed after detecting many
consecutive display errors. Furthermore, voters must
be conscious about error management, i.e., if a voter
gets 6 errors in 7 authentication attempts, then there
is an obvious problem with the displayed images and
the voter should not further consider them in the cur-
rent voting process. If, on the contrary, the voter gets
1 error in the same 7 attempts, then probably the er-
ror was caused by an occasional misinterpretation of
feedback elements.
Active is less convenient to voters but is more se-
cure, because voters can not proceed without properly
authenticating the image. But some escape mecha-
nism should exist to prevent denial of service attacks
by hosting computers or visual problems with voters;
for instance, after a limited sequence of authentication
errors the terminal should abandon the presentation of
images and use only its small display to show contents
to the voter. Active feedback is also less convenient
for consecutive authentication with different colours.
This means that voters may tend to minimize the in-
put feedback to proceed with the voting process, thus
reducing the overall authentication strength.
Concluding, both policies have pros and cons: for
voter convenience we should go for passive valida-
tion, for voter security we should go for active vali-
dation. We expect that usability tests may introduce
some bias towards each of these policies.
6.4 Preliminary Usability Experiences
For evaluating the usability of this voting interface
with many people we developed a Java applet demon-
strator1. This demonstrator contains a replica of the
FINREAD terminal and the image presented by the
hosting computer and implements only passive feed-
back. Furthermore, it allows voters to choose the set
of colours used for painting the actual question and its
answers. This dynamic colour palette enables voters
to learn the set of colours they feel comfortable with,
in order to ultimately customize their smartcard for
controlling their FINREAD terminal.
Preliminary experiences showed that scattered
colouring of isolated letters introduces a very high
cognitive load in the authentication task. Further-
more, long questions or many answers require many
colours, because feedback strings have a limited
length, which further complicates the location of the
feedback characters.
A solution for this problem is aggregation of char-
acters with the same colour. Aggregation facilitates
significantly the location of the coloured characters
being used in the authentication process, because the
text to authenticate becomes coloured by “areas”.
Furthermore, aggregation improves the readability of
text when using many different colours The demon-
strator allows voters to change the level of aggrega-
tion to evaluate its impact in the cognitive load in-
volved in ballot authentication operations
Changing the colour associated with the feedback
string, without changing the image presented by the
hosting computer, enables the voter to validate as
many “areas” of the presented question and answers
as she feels required, in order to increase her confi-
dence in the authentication. High aggregation levels
and short questions, or sets of answers, such as yes/no
answers, may even produce feedback strings with all
the text to authenticate.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we described a proposal for enhanc-
ing the interface of an FINREAD-based, portable vot-
ing terminal. This interface presents ballot images in
the hosting computer display, but prevents the host-
ing computer to violate the voter privacy or to deceive
him with fake images without being noticed.
The design of the enhanced interface relies on the
fact that voters have two different displays: one pro-
tected, on the terminal, and another insecure one, pro-
vided by the hosting computer. The terminal dis-
play shows small amounts of information allowing the
voter to check his answers and verify the correctness
of the presented image. For verifying the correctness
of the image a different kind of visual authentication
is used, based on random, coloured feedback charac-
ters. Even with a small number of colours it is possi-
ble to reduce to acceptable levels the probability of
deceiving a voter with tampered images. Anyway,
this (small) probability can be arbitrary reduced by
1http://www.ieeta.pt/˜avz/FINREAD
allowing the voter to require many different, consec-
utive visual authentications for each image.
The implementation of this enhanced interface is
in the beginning. First we will use the demonstrator
to conduct usability tests in order to evaluate its prob-
lems and limitations. For this purpose, we plan to
improve the demonstrator to handle either passive or
active feedback and to introduce errors in the image
presented in the hosting computer. Only afterwards
we will add it to the current REVS TCB, using the
FINREAD terminal.
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